

CHRISTIAN SERVICE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

**ASSESSMENT OF OFFICE BUREAUCRACY AND ITS EFFECT ON
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA
(A CASE STUDY OF KUMASI METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY)**

ROBERT AYINSONGYA ANABA

LAUREEN KONADU-AFOAKWA

BERTHA ODAME ASARE

ERNEST OWUSU ACHIAW

NANCY OWUSU-AFRIYIE

PRECIOUS KWAKU HEYMANN

JUNE, 2012

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| Name of Student | Index Number | Signature | Date |
|----------------------------|--------------|-----------|-------|
| 1. ANABA ROBERT AYINSONGYA | 10124104 | | |
| | | | |
| 2. KONADU-AFOAKWA LAUREEN | 10124174 | | |
| | | | |
| 3. ODAME ASARE BERTHA | 10124195 | | |
| | | | |
| 4. OWUSU ACHIAW ERNEST | 10124222 | | |
| | | | |
| 5. OWUSU-AFRIYIE NANCY | 10124229 | | |
| 6. HEYMANN PRECIOUS KWAKU | 10135771 | | |

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I hereby certify that the preparation of this long essay was supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of long essay laid down by the Christian Service University College – Kumasi

Certified by:

.....

| | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| MR. Gabriel Dwomoh | Signature | Date |
| (Supervisor) | | |

Head of Department

Kwaku Ahenkorah (Dr.)

.....

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to our lovely families:

The Afoakwa family, The Akobulko-Naba family, The Odame family, The Owusu-Afriyie family, The Heymann Family and The Taylor family.

ABSTRACT

The study is “the assessment of office bureaucracy and its effects on the performance of organizations in Ghana” using the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly as a case study. The objectives of this study includes: to find out why organizations practice bureaucracy, to investigate the effects of bureaucracy on employees as well as organizational performance, and to give practicable recommendations.

The methodology used was included convenience, purposive and simple random sampling techniques with a sample size of 101 KMA employees. Questionnaire was the data collection instrument used. The data collected was statistically analyzed with Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) using descriptive statistics to generate the frequencies.

The findings were: KMA is one of the highest bureaucratic structures governed by Law and Acts of Ghana; bureaucracy has the worse impact on performance than any other constraining factor; 80.2% disclosed that management is unwilling to attempt any de-bureaucratization; less than average thinks it has positive impact on performance; the Ghanaian bureaucracy is not in support of the socio-economic development of the nation; Meanwhile employees (65.3%) are ever ready to embrace a less bureaucratic structure to avoid the undesirable aspect of the bureaucratic processes. 58.4% consented that indeed organizations should go on with their bureaucracies but it should be made flexible.

This study proposes that organizational structure, namely bureaucracy, have direct effect on employee performance and organizational growth. Organizational health and success in the future may depend more on organizational structure than on access to capital and market monopolies. It is therefore recommended that bureaucratic organizations should undergo reformation, adopt performance reward philosophy and a deliberate education to reorient the Ghanaian minds.

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May the blessings and the peace of the Creator be unto you all!

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|
| P.N.D.C.L LAW | PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL |
| K.M.A | KUMASI METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY |
| G.N.C.C.I | GHANA NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE |
| B.N.I | BUREAU OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS |
| L.E.D | LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT |
| C.E.P.S | CUSTOM EXCISE AND PREVENTIVE SERVICE |
| V.A.T | VALUE ADDED TAX |
| I.R.S | INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE |
| G.R.A | GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY |
| P.E.O.U | POLICY EVALUATION OVERSIGHT UNIT |
| M.D.As | MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS, and AGENCIES |
| C.E.O | CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER |

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Bureaucracy long existence as an organizational structure cannot be overlooked in large organizations especially in government institutions. Bureaucracy is noted with the hierarchical division of labour in organizations and the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly is no exemption considering the planning, engineering, financing, and administrative sectors. Some authors argue that it had to be imagined today, but years ago bureaucracy meant something positive. It connoted a rational, efficient method of organization - something to take the place of arbitrary exercise of power by authoritarian regimes. Bureaucracy brought the same logic to government work that the assembly line brought to the factory. With the hierarchical authority and functional specialization, they made possible the undertaking of large complex tasks. Any organization seeking to achieve its goals, would consider various forms or structures since the structure can affect the performance of the organization.

Fincham and Rhodes (1999) said that in all areas of economic life industry, government, public and private services- there are complex and highly developed administrative structures which reflect the growth of bureaucratic forms of organizational work. Across the world, many large organizations are characterized by bureaucratic process and procedures, because it serves as a check and balance for employers and employees who might want to indulge in practices that contravene the rules and regulations of such institutions. For that matter bureaucracy cannot be disputed regarding the performance of organizations like the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.

When the national government establishes policies and creates programs, bureaucracy becomes necessary to see that those policies and programs become reality. For example, when the parliament passes an environmental legislation, it must establish an agency to monitor and ensure compliance with the standards it sets. When it creates farmer assistance programs, a bureaucracy is required to oversee and administer the program.

Bureaucrats, the nature of the job they do, stand between the lawmakers who create public policy and public programs and the people. They are uniquely positioned, then, to see both sides of the picture, the political side in Accra and the practical side in Kumasi, Ho or any other locality. However, because they are often given specific and narrow guidelines for the implementation of the programs the parliament creates, bureaucrats often lead frustrating lives, unable to exercise the discretion they and the beneficiaries of government programs would like to. On the other hand, when bureaucrats are given too much discretion, the Legislative and the public often complain that the bureaucracy has become a "law unto itself."

Simply put, bureaucracy is the means toward a host of public and social policy ends. As such, many people believe that bureaucracy is a "necessary evil," an unfortunate requirement in the implementation of policies aimed at promoting the "general welfare" of the nation. Another perhaps more accurate view suggests that bureaucracy, in itself, is benign--the policies it implements are what should be judged as either "good" or "bad" by the people and their leaders. The bureaucratic institution has neither the power to create laws or to ignore them. It must simply enact what laws the Legislative and President make.

One of the strongest critics of bureaucratic organization and the demands it makes on the worker is Chris Argyris, an American business theorist. He claims that bureaucracy restricts the psychological growth of the individual and cause feelings of failure,

frustration and conflicts. He suggested that, organizational environment should provide a significant degree of responsibilities and self control; commitment to the goals of the organization, productiveness and work and opportunity to apply their full abilities.

Bureaucracy provides a mechanism to ensure qualified employees, supervision and predictable outcome. A system which is bound by rules to control or check orderliness in organizations.

Meanwhile there is delay in organizational processes in bureaucratic institutions when the management, employees and client has to follow the lay down rules of the organization which in effect might affect high performance because if an employee or a manager who has to take up a task is not at work, then that work has to be on hold until that worker is around. That is, to say division of labour slows down organizational output in bureaucratic organization like the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.

The bureaucratic model has the potential for objectivity and impartiality in the hiring, firing, and promotion processes. This notwithstanding, the concept slows downs decision-making processes because of the continuous flow of procedures.

1.2 Statement Of The Problem

Every organization seeks to satisfy their customers or clients in relation to a set of objectives. Bureaucracy provides a mechanism to ensure qualified employees; supervision; and predictable outcome are achieved. A system which has rules to control or check orderliness in organizations – Checks and Balances.

The bureaucratic model has the potential for objectivity and impartiality in the hiring, firing, and promotion processes.

The theory slows downs decision-making processes because of the continuous flow of procedures while there is delay in organizational processes in bureaucratic institutions for

instance, when the management, employees and clients have to follow the laid down rules of the organization which in effect might affect high performance because if a worker who has to take up a task is not at work, then that work will come to a standstill until that worker is around. That is to say division of labour slows down organizational output in bureaucratic organizations like the KMA.

The fact that bureaucracy is necessary is indisputable. Even organizations on the smallest of scales must administer its programs and implement its policies. The primary dilemma of bureaucracy, however, is an extension of the dilemma of popular governance - striking the right balance between providing order and protecting liberty. When a bureaucracy is given authority, it is given that authority to establish order, usually in the form of peace, safety, and economic security or stability. When an organizational bureaucracy exercises authority, the liberty of the people is necessarily diminished. But how much should liberty be diminished and for what purposes or objectives?

A second and related dilemma faced by bureaucracy is the conflict between authority and accountability. If efficiency were the only objective of administration, bureaucracies would be given extensive power and discretion. In a political system in which the powers of government are derived from the people, the government must be accountable to the people for how it exercises those powers. Similarly, managerial and administrative effectiveness demands that bureaucracies and bureaucrats be armed with the tools, authority and flexibility they need to accomplish the tasks they are assigned. However, popular governance demands that bureaucracies and bureaucrats be held accountable for their actions. These objectives are not always compatible. Time spent responding to legislative parliamentary enquiries and investigations or holding public hearings satisfy the demands of accountability, but they directly diminish the capacity of bureaucracies to accomplish their allotted responsibilities.

The question is “to what extent has institutions been able to live up to the demands of bureaucracy, that is how has bureaucracy promoted economic growth and development in Ghana?”

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the research is to assess office bureaucracy and its effects on the performance of organizations. The following are the specific objectives for the study:

- ✓ To examine the purposes of bureaucracy in organizations.
- ✓ To investigate the effect of bureaucracy on employees' performance as well as organizations.
- ✓ To examine the reactions of clients to bureaucratic practices.
- ✓ To make recommendations as to how to improve performance in bureaucratic organizations.

1.4 Research Questions

The researcher intends to answer the following questions regarding this topic;

- ✓ Why bureaucracy is practiced in organizations particularly the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly?
- ✓ What effect has it got on the performance of organizations?
- ✓ What impact has it got on the Kumasi Metropolis?
- ✓ How should people in the society react to a bureaucratic system?
- ✓ Should it be recommended or not?

1.5 Significance of the Study

It is hoped that the findings of this study would contribute to finding a lasting solution to the numerous challenges faced by institutions in Ghana that practice bureaucracy. The study seeks to address the perception that ‘office bureaucracy is not good for growth’.

It is also hoped that by this study we would be able to come out with specific recommendations of reassuring the bureaucratic organizations. The study or research would also be beneficial to the bureaucratic organizations as it would furnish them with an external and objective assessment of their operations and the subsequent associated effects on their clientele.

1.6 Scope And Limitation of the Study

There are numerous institutions currently practicing office bureaucracy all over Ghana. But due to constraint factors this study has the KMA (Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly) and their workers in the Ashanti region of Ghana as the population for the purpose of this study.

The institution in this scope is KMA - Ashanti region. KMA was selected by the undertakers of this study due to factors such as familiarity with the population and an advantage in terms of language or dialect as well as its departmentalized administration with large number of employees.

1.7 Organization of the Study

The research work will be organized into five chapters as follows;

Chapter One

This chapter deals with the general issues on the research topic which consists of the background of the study, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the research, scope and limitation of the study and how the entire research is going to be organized.

Chapter Two

This covers the literature review with respect to the research topic, which is ‘assessment of office bureaucracy and its effects on organizational in Ghana (a case study at Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly). The study will look at the theoretical views and also discuss the empirical evidence and the institutional framework on the topic aforementioned.

Chapter Three

The Chapter three will explain the various methods (the methodology) employed in carrying out the research. Study design which comprises the study type, study variables, sampling technique and sampling size, definition of the population, and the techniques used in analyzing the data.

Chapter Four

The result of the research will be presented and discussed in this chapter. Data analysis method and ethical consideration regarding the study are all included here.

Chapter five

The chapter involves the summary of the major findings, recommendations and conclusion of the entire study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the related research of other peoples; the various sources being books, journals and other publications. The overview of the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, their operational mandate and functions is also elaborated in this section.

Across the world, many authors have expressed their views on the word ‘bureaucracy’ and the apparent effects on organizations’ performance. While some see bureaucracy as a problem others see it as the solution to effective administration. It is a type of organizational structure mostly found in many large institutions, public or private. This section reviews the effects of bureaucracy, characteristics, a historical retrospection of bureaucracy and its adoption by institutions in Ghana and why organizations like the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly adopt this system.

2.2 Development of Bureaucracy

Bureaucracies date back to ancient societies across the globe. About 10,000 years ago, at about the same time as the beginnings of agriculture, someone developed two important inventions. One was *hierarchy*. The other was *regimentation* and specialization. The result: social structures that were triangular in shape. Bureaucracy was born. “Bureaucracy” wasn’t always a dirty word (Dick, 2003) A brief history of organizations. Interchange, unpublished mimeo.

The history of the idea of bureaucracy is also marked by changes in the public perception of the term. Prior to Weber's defining the idea of bureaucracy, the practice of rational organization of government services according to neutral merit-based qualifications was viewed as a positive antidote to the nepotism and hereditary domination of traditional

monarchical or ethnocentric forms of government. However, across most of the globe, the recent history of the term suggests that it has had a largely negative influence upon society. Indeed, the term *bureaucracy* now evokes epithetical connotations that refer exclusively to perceived inadequacies in institutional policy implementation – jrank.org - Summary of the History of the Idea of Bureaucracy.

The growth of bureaucracy has come about through the increasing size and complexity of organizations and the associated demand for effective administration. The work of classical writers has given emphasis to the careful design and planning of organizational structure and the definition of individual's' duties and responsibilities.

Weberian bureaucracy has its origin in the works by Max Weber (1864-1920), a notable German sociologist, political economist, and administrative scholar who contributed to the study of bureaucracy and administrative discourses.

Weber described many ideal types of public administration and government in his magnum opus *Economy and Society* (1922). His critical study of the bureaucratization of society became one of the most enduring parts of his work. It was Weber who began the studies of bureaucracy and whose works led to the popularization of this term. As the most efficient and rational way of organizing, bureaucratization for Weber was the key part of the rational-legal authority, and furthermore, he saw it as the key process in the ongoing rationalization of the society (Ritzer, 2009).

Weber listed several preconditions for the emergence of bureaucracy:

- The growth in space and population being administered;
- The growth in complexity of the administrative tasks being carried out;
- The existence of a monetary economy requires a more efficient administrative system;

- Development of communication and transportation technologies makes more efficient administration possible but also in popular demand;
- Democratization and rationalization of culture resulted in demands that the new system treats everybody equally.

Weber's ideal bureaucracy is characterized by a hierarchical organization, delineated lines of authority in a fixed area of activity, action taken on the basis of and recorded in written rules, bureaucratic officials need expert training, rules are implemented by neutral officials, and career advancement depends on technical qualifications judged by organizations, not individuals – (Allan, 2005).

According to Gomez-Mejia et al, (2006) “Bureaucracy is a pyramid-shaped structure that consists of hierarchies with many levels of management.” It uses a top-down or “command-and-control” approach to management in which managers provide considerable direction to and have considerable control over their subordinates. A bureaucratic organization is therefore based on functional division of labour. Employees are divided into divisions based on their function -production employees are grouped in one division, marketing employees another, engineering employees in a third, and so on and so forth.

Rigid boundaries separate the functional units from one another. These rigid boundaries also separate workers from one another and from their managers because their bureaucratic structure relies on work specialization. Narrowly specified job descriptions clearly mark the boundaries of each employee’s work. Employees are encouraged to do only the work specified in their job description – no more and no less. They spend most of their time working individually at specialized tasks and usually advance only within one function. For instance, employees who begin their career in sales can advance to

higher positions in sales or marketing but cannot switch into production or finance - (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2006).

Management is centralized and top management has the responsibility for making key decisions. Decisions are implemented from the top down via the chain of command. Workers are told what to do by supervisors, who in turn are handed directions from middle managers, who take orders from the company's top executives (Ibid).

2.3 Definition of Bureaucracy

According to the West's Encyclopaedia of American Law, bureaucracy is a system of administration wherein there is specialization of functions, objective qualifications for office, action according to the adherence of fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority and delegated power. Organizations such as the armed forces or administrative agencies are common examples of bureaucracies.

Moorhead and Griffin (1989) defined bureaucracy as an organizational system characterized by a hierarchy of authority and a system of rules and procedures that if followed would create a maximally effective system for large organizations.

Most of the definitions are based on the ideal bureaucracy propounded by the German sociologist, Max Weber, but then the Oxford English Dictionary defines bureaucracy as the system for controlling or managing a country, company or organization that is operated by a large number of officials who are employed to follow rules carefully.

2.4 Characteristics of Bureaucracy

In the 1900s Max Weber, a German sociologist, wrote a rationale that described the bureaucratic form as being the ideal way of organizing large institutions.

Weber's principles spread throughout both public and private sectors. Even though his writings have been widely discredited, the bureaucratic form lives on.

Weber noted six major principles (Allan, 2005).

1. A FORMAL HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

Each level controls the level below and is controlled by the level above. A formal hierarchy is the basis of central planning and centralized decision making.

The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing the decision of a lower office to its higher authority, in a definitely regulated manner. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy is unilaterally organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called 'private' or 'public' (Johnston, 1993).

When the principle of jurisdictional 'competency' is fully carried through, hierarchical subordination--at least in public office--does not mean that the 'higher' authority is simply authorized to take over the business of the 'lower.' Indeed, the opposite is the rule. Once established and having fulfilled its task, an office tends to continue in existence and be held by another incumbent (Crozier, 1964).

2. MANAGEMENT BY RULES

Johnston (1993), controlling by rules allows decisions made at the higher levels to be executed consistently by all lower levels. A continuous organization of official function

bound by rules, with rules the organizations' personnel could depend upon each other and clients could depend upon the organization for reliable services

The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, or administrative or business management.

The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature. The theory of modern public administration, for instance, assumes that the authority to order certain matters by decree - which has been legally granted to public authorities--does not entitle the bureau to regulate the matter by commands given for each case, but only to regulate the matter abstractly.

3. ORGANIZATION BY FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY

Work is to be done by specialists, and people are organized into units based on the type of work they do or skills they have. A specified sphere of competence: Specific duties are to be divided among people in a clear division of labour and each job holder has to be given the necessary authority to perform those duties - Johnston, 1993.

4. AN "UP-FOCUSED" OR "IN-FOCUSED" MISSION

Johnston (1993), if the mission is described as "up-focused," then the organization's purpose is to serve the stockholders, the board, or whatever agency empowered it. If the mission is to serve the organization itself, and those within it, for example, to produce high profits, to gain market share, or to produce a cash stream, then the mission is described as "in-focused."

5. PURPOSELY IMPERSONAL

The idea is to treat all employees and customers equally, and not be influenced by individual differences. The crucial feature of all forms of authority as a basis of social control is that the power of senior officials should be accepted by those under control. The latter should believe that it is right and proper for people in senior positions to issue directives and equally justifiable that their orders be complied with. Member of the administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means of production or administration. According to Weber, this will maintain the impersonal aspect of organizations that was important to production efficiency (Johnston, 1993).

6. EMPLOYMENT BASED ON TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS

(THERE MAY ALSO BE PROTECTION FROM ARBITRARY DISMISSAL)

Johnston (1993), only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of administrative staff and hence only such persons are eligible for appointment to official positions. The bureaucratic form is so common that most people accept it as the normal way of organizing almost any endeavour. People in bureaucratic organizations generally blame the ugly side of bureaucracy on management, or the founders, or the owners, without awareness that the real cause is the organizing form.

2.5 Criticisms

Bureaucracy has otherwise been subjected to severe criticisms.

Caulkin (1994) refers to the impersonal structure of bureaucracy as constructed round the post rather than the person and the ease with which it can be swung behind unsocial or even pathological ends. 'The overemphasis on process rather than purpose, fragmented

responsibilities and hierarchical control means that it's too easy for individuals to neglect the purposes to which their small effort is being put".

Mullins (1996) also identifies these problems of bureaucracy;

- The over-emphasis on rules and procedures, record keeping and paperwork may become more important in its own right than as a means to an end.
- Officials tend to develop a dependency practice upon bureaucratic status, symbols and rules.
- Initiative may be stifled and when a situation is not covered by a complete set of rules or procedures there is a lack of flexibility or adaptation to changing circumstances.
- Position and responsibilities in the organization can lead to officious bureaucratic behaviour. They may even conceal administrative procedures from outsiders.
- The Impersonal relations can lead to stereotyped behaviour and lack of responsiveness to individual incidents or problems (Mullins, 1996).

Weber's work has been criticized on the grounds that there is lack of attention to the informal organizations and the development of groups with goals of their own, and inadequate recognition of conflict in organizations. Individuals have goals of their own and they devise ways of improving their position in the power struggle within organizations. Formal rules and the rigidity of the system will never fully remove this power struggle. There will always be areas of uncertainty which groups will want to claim and preserve for them.

Jo Hatch (1997) argued that organizations that employ large numbers of professionals will not perform well if they become overly bureaucratic. An organization will not get full value from its professionals employees if it insists that they do only what they are told. Professionals hired for their knowledge and expertise must have the discretion to use their skills and training or much of their value will be wasted. Such waste could be called

inefficiency from the point of the organization, and frustrating from the perspective of the employee. The recent professionalization of management in both private and public sectors through higher education programs has created interesting tensions in some of the largest bureaucracies. As these newly professionalized employees carry their professional values into the organizations, bureaucratic characteristics come into conflict with professionalism and in some cases are starting to be replaced by more flexible ways of doing things.

Bureaucracy is found on a formal clearly defined hierarchical structure. But with rapid changes in the external environment there is an increasing need to reorganize for flexibility.

Fincham and Rhodes (1999) said that the popular view of bureaucracy conjures up an image of unnecessary paperwork, time - consuming procedures, strict adherence to rules, and unresponsiveness to clients. They argued that this common sense of view of bureaucracy as "red tape" mounts an explicit challenge to the Weberian notion of bureaucracy as a highly rational means to an end. The criticisms centred on the forms of incapacity that emerge in elaborate bureaucratic institutions, when officials become preoccupied with administrative process itself. This can happen as a result of an extreme division of labour that allows the bureaucrat to see only a small part of the operation, and also because people's reputations and careers are become bound up with established procedures.

Daft (1989) and Mullins (1996) attest to the fact that bureaucracy allows experts or qualified employees in organizations. On the other hand they agreed that this same system stifles initiative of employees and those in higher authority. The problems of bureaucratic inefficiency and the erosion of democratic freedom were not radically new ideas, even in

Weber's time, so he did not develop his "ideal" model of bureaucracy in a state of ignorance and nativity.

2.6 Empirical Evidence

Why are people so naturally negative about bureaucracy? No doubt, the negativism is, at least in part, due to bad experiences people have had with a bureaucratic agency or office. However, public opinion polls consistently suggest that most people are satisfied with current standardized institutions. Moreover, most people are generally satisfied with their encounters with bureaucrats and bureaucratic agencies. Overall satisfaction with institutional programs and bureaucracy in particular, suggests that much of the hostility toward bureaucracy is the product of general and abstract antigovernment sentiments. There is no easy way to reconcile this apparent contradiction anyway. Indeed, public opinion about bureaucracy is often "varied, contradictory, ambiguous and ephemeral."

Bonsu (2006), in his research topic "evaluation of the impact of bureaucracy in government institutions", found out that the public sector adopts more bureaucratic procedures than the private sector. It was discovered that individuals react negatively when going through bureaucratic processes. It was also recorded that 75% respondents indicated that bureaucracy in this era of modern technology has negative impact on the performance on organizations. He found out some reasons for bureaucracy in Ghana. Some of which are:

- Issues are carefully looked at before it is done. Proper decision making is also experienced in bureaucratic organizations
- It ensures an effective audit trail of records and proper documentation.
- It decreases underground dealings by management and staff and enables organizations to provide efficient and impersonal operation.

The other negative effect of bureaucracy according to the research conducted in the Ghana Commercial Bank Sunyani, Sunyani Municipal Health Insurance Scheme and the Sunyani Municipal Assembly indicated that bureaucracy hinders prompt initiative of staff which affects productivity. The researcher noted that whilst in some organizations bureaucracy has effect on its performance, in other places; the effects are not recognized as such.

2.7 Why Institutions in Ghana Adopt Bureaucracy

Companies that adopt a defender business strategy are likely to choose the bureaucratic organizational structure to pursue its goals. Defender Strategy: used when companies are competing in a stable market and has a well-established product. For example, Electricity Company Of Ghana, Ghana Commercial Bank, Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. Under the defender strategy, work can be efficiently organized into a structure based on an extensive division of labour, with hierarchies of jobs assigned to functional units such as customer service, power generation, accounts, etc.

Rollinson and Dundon (2007) could not agree more when they referred to such a system as "the use of tight job specifications and standard operating procedures to specify employee behaviour, which then becomes the accepted way of doing things, to which employees conform. That is limits are placed on employee discretion by clearly defining their (employees) roles with a tight specification and yet again standardizing the operating procedures to specify 'how things should be done'"

Fincham and Rhodes (1999) elaborated on authority and rationality in bureaucracy when they said that in common with most social scientists, Weber was centrally concerned with problem of social order. The crucial feature of all forms of authority as a basis of social

control is that the power of senior officials should be accepted by those under control. Rational authority forms the basis of modern work organizations and those (institutions) in Ghana are no exception. Weber was convinced that order was inherent in the bureaucracy's distinctively rational structure and that this reflected its fundamental importance to industrial society. Bureaucracy thus permits the calculation and predictability of future outcomes, another with accountability and close control of activities. Bureaucratic authority has advantage over other types since rational action is evidence throughout the organization, as well as in the organization's relations to its market and clients. They are of the view that bureaucracy is noted with division of labour, principle of hierarchy, those in lower positions are bound to follow the orders of their officials. These characters bring order in a bureaucratic organization like KMA, serve as control mechanism, and to instil discipline in the work force.

Daft (1989) gave sonic reasons why organizations adopt this system; that it facilitates the allocation of resources in an increasingly complex society. He said bureaucratic dimensions provide a standardized impersonal way to control organizations. Bureaucracy supplies a mechanism to ensure qualified employees are selected, there is proper supervision, and predictable outcomes. Rational control was the fundamental idea for this new form of organization.

The bureaucratic model has the potential for objectivity and impartiality in the hiring, promotion and termination processes. Technical competence is preferable to family ties or social status as the basis for holding positions. Specialization and division of labour promote efficiency. Rational legal authority (employees' beliefs in the legality of rules and the right of those elevated to authority to issue command) enables the implementation and use of bureaucracy. A non-bureaucratic form of organization seems wasteful and

inefficient compared with this model. Thus it represents a control mechanism that enables efficient organizational functioning.

Effective organization is based on structure and delegation through different layers of the hierarchy. Greater specialization and the application of expertise and technical knowledge have highlighted the need for laid down procedures in institutions, hence bureaucracy (Mullins 1996). In the case of the public sector organizations, in particular, there is a demand for uniformity of treatment, regularity of procedures and accountability for their operations. These leads to adherence to specific rules and procedures which limit the degree of discretion exercised by management, and to the keeping of detailed records. It is interesting to note that despite the criticism of bureaucracy, people in their dealings with the public sector organizations often call for what amount to "increased bureaucracy", even though they may not use the term. One can frequently see the letters in the newspapers, for example, that call for the rule of law and a clearer set of rules in dealing with benefit claims from government departments instead of arbitrary decisions made on the opinion of a particular manager in a particular office. Jo Hatch (1997) on the other hand indicates that Weber's bureaucracy was not the ponderous, frustrating, bastion of mediocre public service that some people associate with this concept, but was a rationalized moral alternative to the common practice of nepotism and the abuses of power that were rampant in the feudal pre-industrialized world from which the modern organization emerged.

2.8 Ghana's Bureaucracy

Starting with the topic of transient nomadic dictatorships and why they are not compatible with industrialized societies, we can outline the machinations and internal rumblings of a run and tumble system of ruminators that we call the man. Bureaucracy is simply the

culmination of people, plans, and progress, the necessity of created necessities. The most interesting thing, however, is how institutions and organizations develop an "ethos" or organizational culture. What bureaucrats do depend not only on what they think their primary task is, but to a large degree on who they think they are. Culture is formed mainly according to the situational mandates of the work being done (and also many other factors such as leadership).

In his book, *society and bureaucracy in contemporary Ghana*, Robert M. Price (1975) tries to elaborate on government agencies and what they do.

In his perceptive analysis of the social roots of corruption in an African bureaucracy, the author takes a closer look at the discordance between the performance requirements of the Ghanaian Civil Service and the traditional values which still largely determine the behaviour of its incumbents.

The issues about bureaucracy in Ghana clearly has been the ‘‘poor relation’’. This neglect stems in part from the greater political visibility of some institutions but probably also from a general assumption during the early years of independence that bureaucracy was simply not a ‘‘problem’’ area. The inherited civil service organizations were generally viewed as highly professional and ‘‘development’’ oriented; their personnel were considered central members of a ‘‘modernizing elite’’.

Planners talk eloquently of goals and objectives, but administrative implantation tends to be neglected in favour of resounding policy directives which carry no executive bite. Administrative organs set up to implement rationally conceived monetary, fiscal, and import policies often performed so poorly that bottlenecks of unmanageable proportions are created in the economy. Structures or institutions established to solve economic problems rather create additional obstacles to economic success. A classical example of

this was provided by the administratives of Ghana's import licensing system in 1964, set up to limit the importation of luxuries and thus conserves foreign reserves for needed capital goods imports. A Commission of Enquiry exposed the haphazard, inconsistent, and often corrupt manner in which the system was administered caused by the non-issuing of import licenses in a rational manner, delays in issuance and this slap-dash attitude also led to undesirable situations (Price, 1975).

Thus in the case of Ghana's institutions the empirical focus of this study, a weak bureaucracy has now come to be viewed as a serious element in the problems that faced each of the country's successive political regimes.

Frederick Y. Alipui, Vice Chairman of the Accra Chapter of the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GNCCI), in June 2011, called for firm measures to tackle the bureaucracy that was making it difficult for the smooth operation of their members. In his submission, Alipui said although they were operating in a liberalized market, they were being frustrated by some government agencies (bureaucratic Authorities). He alleged that the activities and conduct of some officials of the Ghana Standard Board, the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority, Police, Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and the Veterinary Service were a bother.

Similarly on March 17, 2012 at Sunyani in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana, Ignatius Baffour-Awuah, Deputy Brong-Ahafo Regional Minister, observed that bureaucracy, and centralized legal and regulatory environment were the bane on Government's determination to ensure rapid socio-economic development and poverty reduction. He made this at a workshop *Local Economic Development (LED)* organized by the Ministries of Trade and Industry and Local Government and Rural Development with support from the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ).

2.8.1 Ends versus Means

According to Price (1975), among the most perplexing problems of bureaucracy in bureaucratic institutions in Ghana is that, in most instances there is broad agreement between policy makers and citizens on what the "ends" or final objectives of public policies and programs ought to be. There tends to be significant disagreement, however, about the "means" by which those ends ought to be pursued. Invariably, bureaucracies and their employees get caught in the middle of these disputes.

New states like Ghana can be seen to be more vulnerable to deficiencies in public administration than the older and more established states of the West. Because the "functional load" carried by bureaucracy in the new states is large, and because these states tend to lack a cushion of political legitimacy to soften the immediate impact of governmental breakdowns or regime change, ineffective administrative organizations pose a threat not only to the achievement of communal goals but also to the very survival of most organizations in Ghana (Ibid).

2.8.2 Incrementalism

In Ghana, efforts to find the right balance between bureaucratic authority and accountability and to create programs that are both efficient and responsive to the needs of the people are complicated by the fact that public policies and programs are made incrementally. Instead of reviewing and redesigning every government function from the ground up every year, the Legislative and the President make minor adjustments, expanding some, shrinking some and leaving others alone. Programs are constantly evaluated and modified, but they are rarely eliminated or completely restructured.

Part of the problem is that when departments, agencies and programs are created, they are created in response to a public need or demand. Once in place, people come to count on the services they provide and eliminating them or reducing them drastically becomes politically unpopular. Instead of removing or rebuilding agencies or programs with defects, the government is more likely to create new programs to serve the needs that are unmet by the existing ones. The net result is that, there is extensive overlap and duplication. Even in the relatively small sphere of crime prevention and youth development policy, there are more than a dozen programs currently in existence. Moreover, as new programs are created, more bureaucracy is required to administer them and the departments and agencies begin to "thicken" (Light 1995).

The question we always ask is, why are public agencies or institutions not given specific and well-defined goals? The reply to this question is simple "multiplication of interests". Accordingly, as time passes, different interests find a place into the mission of the organization and subsequently new goals (for the new interests [supported by politicians] to be satisfied by the agency) are added to the "objectives" list of the agency (mostly, contradictory to each other). You can discern this dynamic by comparing the total page number of some enactments today in enforcement with the original page number when the enactment was first adopted some years ago.

One of the reasons why bureaucratic institutions in Ghana particularly in the public sector do what they do is "red tape". The main reason behind the red tape can be explained with the fact that, since there are high risks at stake when the rules are violated, there is a "tendency" to multiply the rules as (big or small) scandals occur, so as to impede future scandals and violations that consume the trust capital in the eye of the common citizens (Wilson, 1989).

In short, the level of operational effectiveness of bureaucracy can be a constraining factor of enormous significance in the administrative system of contemporary Ghana (Price, 1975).

2.8.3 An Inherited Colonial Legacy

According to Haque (1997), in developing nations like Ghana, one of the most dominant features of bureaucracy is its inherited colonial legacy, in spite of the postcolonial rehabilitation and reforms in the administrative superstructure. In other words, the demise of colonial rule in Ghana has not ended the former metropolitan traditions in bureaucracy with regard to its structure, function, classification, socialization, norms, and attitudes. The colonial legacy is evident even in the inherited pejorative features of bureaucracy such as elitism, paternalism, despotism, distrust, centralization, secrecy, formalism, aloofness, hierarchical rigidity, and urban bias. Regarding such inherited features in African bureaucracies, it is interesting to note that the most essential traits the colonial bureaucracy, left behind by the British about half a century ago, still form the part and parcel of the state bureaucracies of Ghana.”

2.8.4 Ghana’s Bureaucracy and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana

Bureaucracy versus Economy

In advanced capitalist nations, the economic context of bureaucracy is predominantly characterized by strong market forces, the institutions of free economic competition, the tradition of limited state intervention, and a complementary relationship between the state and private capital. In most developing countries like Ghana, however, the economic contexts are quite different: The market forces are weak, free economic competition is limited, state intervention is expansive, and relationship between the state and indigenous capital is often conflicting. Such economic circumstances imply a discord between the

administrative and economic realms in these countries, because although they have adopted a Western model of bureaucracy, their economic contexts remain significantly different from Western economies.

First, the social formation in most postcolonial developing nations is such that they inherited an advanced administrative system and a relatively backward economy at the same time. This colonial formation of an advanced bureaucracy and a backward economy continued in most developing countries after their decolonization.

The economic role of state bureaucracy has been rationalized on the grounds such as to reduce foreign domination over the economy, substitute for weak private sector, induce entrepreneurship, and regulate natural monopolies. But except for the relatively positive economic role played by bureaucracy in a few newly industrialized countries, in most cases, this bureaucratic intervention often diminished the scope of market competition, restricted the opportunity for private investment, and constrained the formation and expansion of indigenous capital – Briones (1985). The extensive bureaucratic intervention in developing economies has been condoned also to achieve various social objectives, such as the generation of employment, redistribution of income, and provision of welfare, which have largely failed to materialize. In fact, through bureaucratic control over various enterprises, income has been often transferred from the common public to the ruling elites. In many developing countries, the state agencies have served the interests of various social elites, but for the urban underclass and the rural masses, these bureaucratic agencies remained unreachable, inaccessible, and indifferent (Smith, 1986).

In short, in Ghana, the advanced nature of bureaucracy has been quite inconsistent with the relatively underdeveloped economic context. Moreover, the role of this interventionist bureaucracy has been in conflict with the interest of indigenous private capital, and it has been often contradictory with the well-being of the common people. Such circumstances

constitute a form of disparity between the administrative aspect and the economic sphere, although the nature and intensity of such disparity may vary among institutions.

Bureaucracy versus Culture

The contemporary Western model of bureaucracy emerged and expanded within a cultural context that embodied certain values and norms such as secularism, individualism, rationality, competition, profit motive, and results orientation. This cultural atmosphere has been conducive to the advancement of Western bureaucracy distinguished by its features of merit, competition, specialization, and impersonality. All societies, however, do not universally possess such values and norms that are compatible with Western bureaucratic model; there are always cross-cultural differences in bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour (Parsons and Shils, 1951).

The point here is that in regard to the nature of relationship between the cultural and administrative realms, there is considerable disparity in Ghana between the values that are immanent in Ghanaian indigenous culture and the values that are inherent in the borrowed bureaucratic model.

First, at a macro societal level, it has been found (though unverified) that the bureaucratic norms of impersonality, merit, rationality, and neutrality are not always compatible with the sectarian and particularistic local norms in the Ashanti region, tribal affiliation in the Northern regions, ethnicity in the Volta region, and personalism and patronage in the Western region.

In multi-ethnic country like Ghana, various forms of preferential policies are often practiced to redress economic, political, and social inequalities between ethnic groups and to promote regional integration. According to Puthucheary (1978), “the ethnic factor permeates all decisions, even those in the past which may have been regarded as purely

administrative and routine decisions”.

Second, at the organizational level, the above incongruity between the exogenous administrative norms and the indigenous social culture is reflected in a gap between the formal official rules and the actual bureaucratic practices, which has been commonly described as “formalism” (Riggs, 1964). This formalism, a gap between official norms and actual practices, can be discovered in various administrative functions in developing countries.

Third, at the individual level, it has been observed that the Western colonial rule and education led to the emergence of an elitist educated class, creation of “diploma disease,” dominance of mental work as opposed to physical work, and secularization of the state elite (especially the top civil servants) – Barnett (1988). As Bryant (1978) suggests, most training programs in developing countries have been “formalistic and narrowly focused upon the techniques used within structured ‘first world’ situations”.

Bureaucracy versus Politics

The Western model of bureaucracy, as practiced in Ghana, is based on certain politico-administrative presuppositions: the existence of an advanced and stable political system, a considerable degree of political neutrality of bureaucracy, an effective mechanism of bureaucratic accountability based on public representation and participation, and an ideological atmosphere of liberal democracy. But the socio-historical realities in Ghana are such that often these presuppositions have little relevance.

It is hardly possible to ascertain the political neutrality of bureaucracy in a developing country like Ghana. In opposition to the principle of such political neutrality that emerged in Western nations, the line between politics and administration in Ghana is relatively blurred. In Africa for instance, there is no country where the civil service norms of

anonymity, impartiality and political neutrality are wholly respected. The colonially inherited notion of civil service neutrality in Africa was a last ditch innovation designed to camouflage the reality of an administration which throughout its history had by definition been far from politically neutral.

2.8.5 Reforming Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy is situated in the same separate system as the Parliament, the Courts and the President. Its size and power are such that many have are termed it the "the invisible arm" of the national government. In some ways the label is appropriate, for it is not entirely under the direction of the President, the constitutional head of the Executive arm. Bureaucracy is not, however, entirely free from presidential or parliamentary influence. Indeed, the President appoints and can remove a good number of or all the top Executive employees, including Department Heads, Chief Executive Officers, Ministers, and Coordinators in almost all public institutions. Cabinet also wields significant influence over bureaucracy through its ability to set agency and departmental budgets and even to eliminate bureaucracies altogether (although it rarely does so).

In order to overcome these problems resulting from various dimensions of mismatch between bureaucracy and society, public administration scholars and experts have prescribed different remedial measures such as administrative reforms, structural decentralization, and various means of bureaucratic accountability. However, these strategies, being mostly related to the administrative sector, have largely failed to overcome these problems, because the roots of such problems often go beyond the administrative sphere and emerge from the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Ghanaian society. For instance, various administrative reforms (structural, procedural, attitudinal) in Africa have been quite ineffective, because these reforms are often imitative

of Western experiences, detached from the indigenous societal context, aloof from local power structure and political culture, and uncritical of the vested interests attached to the existing organizational culture.

2.8.6 Attempted Bureaucratic Reforms

Policy makers have made numerous efforts to reform bureaucracy to make it more cost effective, less redundant, more competent, more accountable, and to accomplish a variety of other objectives. Some of the more prominent past and present reform efforts include:

Bureaucratic Reorganization

By realigning or restructuring departments, agencies and their responsibilities, Presidents and members of Parliament have sought to contain costs, reduce bureaucratic overlap and improve accountability.

This method was adopted in Ghana to integrate the Customs, Excise And Preventive Service (CEPS), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Value Added Tax (VAT) Service and the Revenue Governing Board to become the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) in 2009 following an Act of Parliament; Ghana Revenue Authority Act, 2009 (Act 791). Reorganization is, as one political scientist calls it, the "cod liver oil of government- an all purpose cure for whatever ails the body politic." According to (Gormley Jr, 1989), reorganization efforts, however, have generally not saved the money they have promised. They are, though, a significant catalyst of bureaucratic change and invigoration (Ibid).

Deregulation and Privatization

Among the most popular reform proposals today is the privatization of bureaucracy and the deregulation of industry. The premise behind these proposals is that "most people do not like working in an environment in which every action is second-guessed, every

initiative viewed with suspicion, and every controversial decision denounced as malfeasance" (Wilson,1989). Interjecting the profit motive and easing many of the complex rules that guide bureaucratic behaviour is perceived by many as the "answer" to the problems of institutional administration. Privatization of the then Ghana Telecom brought Vodafone (Gh) Ltd. to Ghana in 2007.

Devolution/Decentralisation

One of the most ambitious, and, by many accounts, “most successful” attempts to reform and reshape bureaucracy in Ghana was or/and is decentralisation and devolution.

For instance in Ghana, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, nation officially underwent twin processes of decentralization and democratization. The local government law PNDCL 207 of 1988 established a system of district assemblies (called metropolitan or municipal assemblies in the main urban centres), together with a hierarchy of lower levels of local government (Government of Ghana (1994), *The New Local Government System*, Accra, Ministry of Local Government). The intention of the legislation was to bring about effective decentralization of government functions by integrating the dualistic colonial system of district administration with local government. After two decades, the fruits of decentralization still remain at large. Central ministries have been reluctant to decentralize sectoral programmes and many of the services on which the poor depend are outside the control of local government.

"Devolution," the transferring of national government resources and authority for the administration of programs away from national-level bureaucracies to the district level has also been experienced in Ghana in respect to the District Common Fund and others.

According to Crook (1994), the underlying philosophy of the 1988 legislation was that the district assemblies would form a basis for a national system of indirect elections to

regional and national level assemblies, on the socialist “democratic centralism” model. The drawback to devolution, however, is that the services provided and policies implemented will be uneven across regions. With unevenness, there is the potential for inequities. Proponents of devolution are quick to point out, though, that unevenness may also be a sign that each region or district has adapted programs and policies to its particular needs.

Administrative decentralisation has centralized power in the hands of municipal bureaucracy; the opportunity for participation has been limited mostly to the rural elite and local bureaucrats while the issue of mass participation remains unrealized. With regard to bureaucratic accountability, many developing countries have adopted various executive, legislative, and judicial mechanisms which have been proven inadequate because these mechanisms of accountability do not address the reality of expansive bureaucratic power resulting from the dominance of bureaucracy over modern organizations, professional expertise, information networks, economic resources, and various means of coercion.

2.8.7 Obstacles to Reforms


There are constant efforts to "reform" bureaucracy and to change its objectives. Bringing about such changes, however, has proven difficult for Presidents and members of Parliament alike.

Accountability

One of the most difficult challenges faced by reformers is establishing accountability for the observable outcomes of public policies and programs. If a program has failed, is it the fault of the bureaucracy? Or was the program Cabinet and the President created fundamentally flawed to begin with? Perhaps the nature of the problem changed so

drastically that the original program or policy is no longer effective - maybe no one is responsible. And even if the responsibility for a program's failure can be attributed to a particular department or agency, who within that department or agency should be held accountable? Should it be the Sector Minister? Departmental Head? Coordinator? Or the rank-and-file employees at the department or agency?

Figure 2.1



Source: thisnation.com

While Harry Truman, 33rd president of U.S from 1945 to 1953, was famous for declaring that the "buck" stopped at his desk, not all Presidents have been so willing to accept ultimate accountability for the actions of the bureaucracy. In the Ghanaian case, Presidents, as well as members of Parliament, have regularly blamed the bureaucracy for policy failures. Parliamentary committees frequently compel department and agency heads to appear before them to explain why this or that program has not succeeded.

Competing Goals of Reformers

Another obstacle to bureaucratic reform is that members of Parliament and Presidents often disagree about what it is that needs reforming. As has been noted, Ghanaian

bureaucracy is often pulled in opposite directions by the often contradictory goals of independent and expert administration on one hand and public accountability and responsiveness on the other. Careerists in departments and agencies might be politically, professionally or ideologically opposed to the attempts at reforms and may simply wait them out, going along with them only enough to avoid serious conflict but not energetically enough to make them work.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The accomplishment of the research objectives necessitate a more comprehensive data to gather and examine information from the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly for the purpose of assessing office bureaucracy and its effect on the performance of this organization. The chapter presents in details the target population, sample techniques and size, data source, research instruments and methods of data analysis. This chapter also entails a brief description of the study area and a justification of the researchers' choice of methodology in relation to the said objectives.

3.2 Background Of The Study Area

3.2.1 Study Design

The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly is the area of study in relation to the assessment of office bureaucracy and its effect on the performance of organizations because it is highly hierarchical considering the Metropolitan Chief Executive as the head through to the Metropolitan Coordinating Director down to the District Assembly Men/Women.

3.2.2 Study Type

This research is an exploratory study on office bureaucracy and its effect on the performance of organizations in Ghana, the study is conducted at the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. This is to unravel the motive behind organizations which are bureaucratic and assess the effects of it on their performance.

3.2.3 Study Variables

Office: The Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary (2000:810) defines office as "a room, set of rooms or building where people work, usually sitting at desks."

An office therefore is a place people sit to work around desks.

Bureaucracy: Bureaucracy is a system of administration wherein there is specialization of functions, objective qualifications for office, action according to the adherence of fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority and delegated power.

Characteristics of Bureaucracy: it is characterized by fixed division of labour, hierarchy of authority, rules and procedures. This brings about employees finding precise rules to follow every time they do something, if there are never-ending rules and procedures in organizations.

Performance: according to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2000) is "how well or badly you do something; how well or badly something works." The researcher will explore all methods to assess how well or badly organizations are affected by the system, bureaucracy.

3.2.4 Definition of the Population

The population under study is the entire workers, clients and the top management of the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. The population comprised of 2500 workers. This population is relevant because for the researchers to fulfil the objectives of this research we will require the informed decisions of this population.

3.2.5 Sampling Technique and Sampling Size

The techniques used were the convenience and purposive sampling which are under non-probability sampling. Convenience sampling was used due to proximity and availability of the sample population.

Purposive sampling was used to enable the researchers ask questions relating to the research objectives from managers. Simple random sampling technique was used to generalize the results.

The sample size is 101 KMA employees.

3.4 Source of Data

3.4.1 Secondary Data Source

The secondary data for the study was collected from sources such as journals, articles of scholars and practitioners, books and other scholar databases. Text books, reports and the internet was the researchers' largest secondary source of data collection.

3.4.2 Primary Data Source

This source of data was collected to enable the researchers to obtain firsthand information on the study. This primary data consists of field data which is collected by the use of structured and unstructured questionnaires which were administered to workers of KMA. The choice of using questionnaire as the method to collect the primary data was because many people are familiar with questionnaires. Again, there is no verbal or visual aspect influencing respondents. The questionnaires are less intrusive and respondents are free to complete them at their own convenient time.

3.4.5 Data Collection Instrument

The primary data used was collected from a structured questionnaire. The questionnaires were administered personally by the researchers. The researchers devote adequate time towards the administration of the questionnaires by visiting KMA to personally distribute the questionnaires to the workers. The researchers administered the questionnaire to 103 workers, however 101 responded. The study will use simple random sampling techniques. According to Westfall (2009) in simple random, each item in the population has the same probability of being selected as part of the sample as any other item.

The sample size was 59 males and 42 females. Open and close ended questionnaires were administered. The open ended sought to solicit in-depth responses and allowed respondents to freely express their views and opinion on the said topic relating to their organization. The close ended questionnaire was used to obtain factual information from the Assembly. Open and close ended questionnaire was also administered to obtain information from the respondents and for them to express themselves without any interruption. Assistance was given to respondents who needed clarification of the topic. It was administered in English.

3.4.6 Data Analysis Method

The Data is analyzed quantitatively based on the questionnaires received from the respondents using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) in generating the percentages and frequencies for the qualitatively data. The responses received were then coded into SPSS to generate tables and charts/graphs to depict the respondents' feedback.

3.4.7 Ethical Consideration

The Head of Department for the Bachelor of Business Administration gave authorization to the researchers to carry out the study at the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. Permission was sort from the Assembly through the Metropolitan Chief Executive before conducting the research. Assistance was given to those who needed clarification and respondents were assured of confidentiality of the information provided, that it was for academic purposes only.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter basically reports what the researchers found in the field and it is geared towards the achievement of the study objectives. The background information was coded to understand the nature of the responses. It is very important to understand the nature of the responses because it gives a deeper understanding of any given research and such information may be useful for future purposes. Consequently, the collected data was analyzed and interpreted in line with the aims of the study which include (but not limited to): to investigate the effects of bureaucracy on the performance of organizations, to examine the purposes of bureaucracy in organizations, and to examine the effects of bureaucracy on employees' performance. Of the 103 questionnaires distributed for this research, 101 employees responded, the analysis is therefore based on these 101 questionnaires.

4.2 Data Presentation with Discussions

The researchers analyzed 101 respondents from the entire study population. With reference to the specific objectives, thus the effects of bureaucracy on the performance of organizations, these are the data retrieved from the field of study.

Table 4.1**AGES OF THE RESPONDENTS**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Valid | BELOW 20 | 5 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| | 21 - 30 | 48 | 47.5 | 47.5 | 52.5 |
| | 31 - 40 | 20 | 19.8 | 19.8 | 72.3 |
| | 41 - 50 | 17 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 89.1 |
| | 51 - 60 | 11 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Out of 101 respondents, 5.0% were below the ages of 20, 47.50% represent those who fall between the ages of 21- 30, 19.8% constitute those between the ages of 31- 40, that of age 41 – 50 is 16.8% and 51 – 60 is 10.9%

Table 4.2 GENDER OF RESPONDENTS

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Valid | MALE | 59 | 58.4 | 58.4 | 58.4 |
| | FEMALE | 42 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Out of the 101 respondents, 58.4% and 41.6% were males and females respectively. Thus, majority of the respondents were males.


Table 4.3 **DEPARTMENTS OF RESPONDENTS**

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid ADMINISTRATION | 25 | 24.8 | 24.8 | 24.8 |
| BUDGET | 12 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 36.6 |
| ENGINEERING | 8 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 44.6 |
| ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH | 11 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 55.4 |
| INTERNAL AUDIT | 8 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 63.4 |
| IT-MIS | 4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 67.3 |
| FINANCE | 31 | 30.7 | 30.7 | 98.0 |
| WASTE AND MANAGEMENT | 2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

The Finance department constituted 30.7% of the sampled respondents, 24.8% represents those at the central administration department, 11.9% represented the Budgetary Department, 10.9% for the Environmental Health department, 7.9%, 7.9%, 4.0%, and 2.0% were the Engineering, Internal Audit, IT-MIS, and Waste and Management departments correspondingly.

Figure 4.1 WORKING EXPERIENCES OF THE RESPONDENTS



Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Out of the sampled respondents 69% have served the institution for 1 - 5years, 16% have stayed in the institution for 6 - 10 years, 10% have work with the institution for 11 - 20 years, 2% have been in the organisation for or over 21 years whilst 4% did not answer the question.

Table 4.4 WHETHER KMA IS BUREAUCRATIC OR NOT

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

All the respondents (100%) affirmed that their company (KMA) practices bureaucracy.

One hundred percent of sampled respondents affirmed that bureaucracy is indeed practiced in the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. The researchers realized that there cannot be successful operations of government or public organization without bureaucracy because of large number of employees who must be guided by written or lay down rules, which ensures uniformity of operations in organization. The researchers experienced some of the hectic part of bureaucracy where the introductory letter of the researchers had to move from office to office; from the registry to the Coordinating Director through to the Chief Executive Director and the Personnel Officer had to take it from there. It was quite an interesting experience anyway.

Table 4.5 THE SECTOR THAT ADOPTS MORE BUREAUCRACY

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid PUBLIC | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

100.0% of the respondents confirm that the public sector adopts bureaucratic procedures than private sector. It was also realised that the public sector adopts more of the bureaucratic procedure in which KMA is not left out. Though a lesser number disclosed that bureaucracy as an organizational practice has no direct bearing on the performance of organizations, a much larger number were of the view that performance is highly affected when organizations adopts this system.

Table 4.6 INTENSITY OF BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Valid | LOW (FLEXIBLE RULES) | 45 | 44.6 | 44.6 | 44.6 |
| | NORMAL (RELAXED RULES) | 33 | 32.7 | 32.7 | 77.2 |
| | HIGH (STRICT RULES) | 23 | 22.8 | 22.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Private sector bureaucracy varies between low (44.6%), normal (32.7%) and high 22.8%).

Table 4.7 INTENSITY OF BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid | NORMAL (RELAXED RULES) | 31 | 30.7 | 30.7 | 30.7 |
| | HIGH (STRICT RULES) | 70 | 69.3 | 69.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Majority (69.3%) responded that public sector bureaucracy is high as compared to 30.7% who said it was normal.

4.2.1 The Purpose of Bureaucracy

In the table below is represented the responses pertaining to reasons why KMA practice this system of administration.

Table 4.8

REASONS FOR A BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM


| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--|------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid AT LEAST 2 | 11 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 10.9 |
| TO GET WORK DONE PROPERLY | 33 | 32.7 | 32.7 | 43.6 |
| FOR PROPER DOCUMENTATION | 18 | 17.8 | 17.8 | 61.4 |
| TO SERVE AS A CONTROL MECHANISM | 39 | 38.6 | 38.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Out of 101 respondents, a sizeable number of respondents (38.6%) were of the view that the organisation adopts bureaucratic system to serve as a control mechanism, 33 respondents representing 32.7% attested that organisation adopts bureaucratic system to get things done properly, 17.8% represent the view of those who said that organisation adopt bureaucratic system for proper documentation. However, 11 respondents representing 10.9% answered that the organisation adopts bureaucratic system for all the above reasons. It was also discovered that some reasons KMA adopted the system of bureaucracy were as follows; to get things done properly, for proper documentation and also to serve as a control mechanism since the organization is bound by Acts, and other statutory documents.

4.2.2 Effects of Bureaucracy on Performance.

Figure 4.1 **EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRACY**



Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

52.5% confirmed that bureaucracy reduces productivity, stifles initiatives, delays decision making process, and delays projects. 45.5% said it enhances supervision, specialization, ensures effectiveness and good records keeping. 2.0% (missing) did not answer.

Table 4.9 BENEFITS OF BUREAUCRACY

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|--|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | ORDERLINESS, CHECKS AND BALANCE, LAY DOWN RULES AND PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWED, DIVISION OF LABOUR | 88 | 87.1 | 94.6 | 94.6 |
| | NO ANSWER | 5 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 93 | 92.1 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | | 8 | 7.9 | | |
| Total | | 101 | 100.0 | | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

87.1% responded that benefits like orderliness, checks and balance, adherence of rules and procedures and division of labour. 5.0% said no answer while 7.9% did not attend to the question.

Table 4.10 BUREAUCRACY CREATES EXCESS RULES

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 63 | 62.4 | 62.4 | 62.4 |
| NO | 38 | 37.6 | 37.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Majority of the sampled respondents (62.4%) were in that affirmative that bureaucracy creates more rules and procedures, whereas 37.6% of the respondents thought otherwise.

Table 4.11 PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid NO DESCRETION, NO CREATIVITY, NO INITIATIVES, LOW PRODUCTIVITY, CREATES CONFLICT, STALLS WORK | 50 | 49.5 | 90.9 | 90.9 |
| NO PROBLEM | 5 | 5.0 | 9.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 55 | 54.5 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | 46 | 45.5 | | |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

While 49.5% said no discretion, creativity, initiatives, low productivity, creates conflict, and stalls work were some of the problems they face 5.0% said there was no problem with the system whilst 45.5% declined to answer.

Table 4.12 POSITIVE IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Valid | YES | 47 | 46.5 | 46.5 | 46.5 |
| | NO | 54 | 53.5 | 53.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

For the 101 respondents, 46.5% were of the view that bureaucracy contributes immensely to boosting the performance of the organization. Conversely 53.5% responded that bureaucracy rather impede organizational performance.

In spite of these negative effects of bureaucracy on performance of organization, it bears some positive impact on performances, which were elaborated as enhancement of effective supervision, proper management, enhances specialization, and ensures good record keeping (45.5%).

Table 4.13 NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 80 | 79.2 | 79.2 | 79.2 |
| NO | 21 | 20.8 | 20.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

However asked again whether there is a negative impact on performance and 79.2% representing 80 respondents said yes it (bureaucracy) has. Whereas 20.8% responded that it does not.

The researchers realized bureaucracy affects performance in several ways. Respondents explained how organizations are affected negatively in a bureaucratic system. These were detailed as; reduces productivity, delay in decision making, delays in projects, and stifles initiatives (52.5%).

Table 4.14 BUREAUCRACY STIFLES INITIATIVES

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 63 | 62.4 | 62.4 | 62.4 |
| NO | 38 | 37.6 | 37.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

62.4% were of the view that bureaucracy prevents employees from taking initiatives and 37.6% responded that it does not stifle their initiatives.

Table 4.15 DELAYS DECISION MAKING

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 57 | 56.4 | 56.4 | 56.4 |
| NO | 44 | 43.6 | 43.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Except for 43.6% of the respondents who indicated that bureaucracy does not have any direct bearing on the rate of decision making 56.4% however confirmed that bureaucracy slows down decision making of the organization.

Table 4.16 KMA HAS FIXED RULES

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 99 | 98.0 | 98.0 | 98.0 |
| NO | 2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

99 respondents (98.0) attested that there are fixed rules in the organization while 2 (2.0) said the opposite.

Table 4.17 RESTRICTIONS/DIVISION OF LABOUR

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Valid | YES | 82 | 81.2 | 81.2 | 81.2 |
| | NO | 19 | 18.8 | 18.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

81.2% of the 101 respondents sampled confirmed the existence of division of labour according to specialization. But 18.8% viewed otherwise.

Table 4.18 DECREASE COORDINATION

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Valid | YES | 26 | 25.7 | 25.7 | 25.7 |
| | NO | 75 | 74.3 | 74.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

Majority of the sampled respondents (74.3%) attested that bureaucracy does not decrease co-ordination among authorities. Conversely 25.7% answered that bureaucracy decreases co-ordination among authorities.

Respondents concluded that the existence of hierarchy in the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly however ensures co-ordination among authorities. Each authority liaises with one another effectively. This was a reflection of the 74.3% of the sampled respondents who affirmed that bureaucracy increases co-ordination among authorities.

4.2.3 Reactions

Table 4.19 CLIENTS' REACTIONS

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Positive | 59 | 58.4 | 58.4 | 58.4 |
| Negative | 42 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

A sizeable number of respondents (41.6%) affirm that clients react abysmally to the bureaucratic processes whilst 58.4% of the respondents said clients are comfortable with the bureaucratic processes.

Clients such as contractors who take up contracts from the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly find it quite a hectic process in such hierarchy before contracts are awarded.

The process of moving from one office to the other is in fact time consuming. This was affirmed by the sampled workers of 41.6% who disclosed that clients react negatively when going through the bureaucratic processes of the Assembly. The respondents 58.4% affirmed that clients react negatively to the bureaucratic processes.

**Table 4.20 SHOULD THE ORGANIZATION REMAIN
BUREAUCRATIC?**

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid YES | 59 | 58.4 | 58.4 | 58.4 |
| NO | 42 | 41.6 | 41.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

58.4% consented that indeed organizations should go on with their bureaucracies. They however suggested that to still remain so the stakeholders must be educated to at least understand benefits of having a bureaucratic system. Yet again, the institutions must work between flexibility and rigidity.

Table 4.21 MANAGEMENT READINESS TO MINIMIZE BUREAUCRACY

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 20 | 19.8 | 19.8 | 19.8 |
| NO | 81 | 80.2 | 80.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

For 101 respondents representing 100%, 80.2% said management was not ready to minimize bureaucracy whilst only 19.8% contended that management was ready to minimize the bureaucracy. Out of the 101 respondents which were workers of KMA, 80.2% disclosed the reluctance of management in minimizing bureaucracy in the organization; this is because management perceives bureaucracy as a means of legitimate authority, a means to control organizational resources and such the normal system of administration.

Table 4.22 PREFERENCE FOR A LESS BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid YES | 66 | 65.3 | 65.3 | 65.3 |
| NO | 35 | 34.7 | 34.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 101 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Work (May, 2012)

While 65.3% wish for a less bureaucratic institution, 34.7% does not.

Meanwhile employees (65.3%) are ever ready to embrace a less bureaucratic structure to avoid the undesirable aspect of the bureaucratic processes since it is less-employee-friendly.

The sampled respondents of 65.3% were of the view that bureaucracy must be minimized in order to avoid its demerits. It can be argued that organizations will not get full value from its professional employees if it insists that they do only what they are told.

The researchers realized that there cannot be successful operations of government or the public organization without bureaucracy because of large number of employees who must be guided by written or lay down rules, which ensures uniformity of operations in organizations. The researchers experienced some of the hectic part of bureaucracy where the introductory letter of the researchers had to move from office to office; from the registry to the Coordinating Director through to the Chief Executive Director and the Personnel Officer had to take it from there. It was quite an interesting experience anyway.

4.3 Discussions in Relation to Existing Theories

Mouzelies (1975) in his account of bureaucracy indicated that it permits of calculation and predictability of future outcomes, together with accountability and close control of activities. This relates directly to the findings in which respondents indicated that organizations adopt bureaucratic system for reasons like serving as a control mechanism, proper documentation and things are done appropriately.

Daft (1989) describes bureaucracy as a continuous organization of official function bound by rules. This was affirmed by KMA that the Assembly's administration is bound by these

laws and Acts; Civil service law 1993, PNDCL 327, Financial Administration Act 2003, Act 654, Public Procurement Act 2003, Act 663 and Internal Audit Agency Act 2003, Act 658.

Mullins (1996) also indicated that effective organization is based on structure and delegation through different layers of the hierarchy. This theory attests to the findings the researchers retrieved. This was a reflection of the 74.3% of the sampled respondents who affirmed that bureaucracy increases co-ordination among authorities. Mullins again bears the idea that the public sector adopts the bureaucratic system to ensure uniformity of treatment, regularity of procedures and accountability for their operations, 100% of respondents confirmed this.

The sampled respondents of 65.3% were of the view that bureaucracy must be minimized in order to avoid its demerits. This justified the view of Jo Hatch (1997) who argued that organizations will not get full value from its professional employees if it insists that they do only what they are told.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will conclude on the research findings of the problem, the methodology used and summarizes the importance of the research findings in chapter four and finally draw a conclusion based on the findings and provide practical recommendations.

5.2 Summary of Findings

After undertaking this research into office bureaucracy and its effect on the performance of institutions in Ghana, the research has revealed the expansiveness and entrenching yet paralleling nature of bureaucracy in the Ghanaian economy, culture and politics. It has by far not been able to yield as Max Weber envisage and so remains as an illusion to the accolade of the Ghanaian worker in the politico-socio-economical environment.

The major findings are: KMA is one of the highest bureaucratic structures governed by Law and Acts of Ghana; bureaucracy has the worse impact on performance than any other constraining factor; management is unwilling to attempt any de-bureaucratization; it has a negative relation with clients of KMA; less than average thinks it has positive impact on performance; the Ghanaian bureaucracy is not in line with the socio-economic development of the nation; and that majority of employees wish or prefer a less bureaucratic structure.

Failure to pay attention to the thickening institutions over the past half century may doom any reinventing effort. This research presents a revealing look at how thick the bureaucracy really is, how and why thickening occurs, what difference it might make, and

what can be done to both reverse the process and keep the thickening from growing back. Thickening often creates so many bureaucratic baffles that no one can be held accountable for any decision. Information gets distorted on the way up, and guidance gets lost on the way down; mid-level workers may have so many bosses that they effectively have none.

In this regard, it is necessary to shift economic power from both the state bureaucracy to the common people through the formation of economically self-reliant organizations at the grass-roots levels for both rural and urban population. Such a change must go beyond the current rhetoric of decentralization that focuses mainly on “administrative” structures without much consideration for the “economic” dependency of local structures on the state bureaucracy.

5.3 Conclusion

The purpose of the study was to conduct an assessment of office bureaucracy in institutions in Ghana and its effect on the performance of organizations using KMA as a model.

We conclude that; bureaucracy has the worse impact on performance than any other constraining factor as evident in the findings; bureaucracy has been quite inconsistent with the relatively underdeveloped economic of the nation; bureaucracy emerged and expanded within a cultural context that embodied certain values and norms such as individualism, competition, profit motive, and results orientation. This cultural atmosphere has been conducive to the advancement of Western bureaucracy. All societies, however, do not universally possess such values and norms that are compatible with Western bureaucratic model; there are always cross-cultural differences in bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour and must be addressed.

This dissertation explained that due to various socio-historical factors, different forms of discrepancies have emerged between bureaucracy and politics, bureaucracy and the economy, and bureaucracy and culture in developing countries, like Ghana. Such discord, in turn, has led to the perpetuation of administrative, political, economic, and cultural problems, which represent an overall condition of underdevelopment.

There comes a time when the sediment of past reforms becomes so thick that agencies simply cannot operate with any semblance of the efficiency, economy, fairness, or performance envisioned before. Nor is it possible to implement new reforms within a hierarchy that is packed with offices and titleholders who are still struggling to implement past reforms. Much as a blue-ribbon commission would embrace scientific management, it could also strengthen the other factors by reconciling the continuing conflicts between often-contradictory goals such as openness and privacy, speed and fairness, compliance and creativity, and consistency and innovation.

5.4 Recommendations

5.4.1 Keys to Reform

Given the significant obstacles to bureaucratic reforms, several important observations can be made. First, if reforms are to occur, they are unlikely to occur rapidly. Reformers must be willing to work at implementing their proposed reforms over several years. Second, a clear set of goals must be articulated and promising new solutions must be identified. A plan that simply replaces old inefficiencies with new ones is unlikely to win broad support. Finally, reformers must work to build consensus across and within the middle and Executive levels as well as the rank-and-file employees of the organization. For the reforms to work, they must have broad or cross political support as well.

5.4.2 Practical Recommendations

Reformation

The reforms should not be imitative but rather need-based. The strategies that have been used before mostly are related to the administrative sector, which they have largely failed to overcome the problems because the roots of such problems go beyond the administrative sphere and emerge from the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Ghanaian society. For instance, various administrative reforms (structural, procedural, attitudinal) in Ghana have been quite ineffective, because these reforms are often imitative of Western experiences, detached from the indigenous society, aloof from the political system, and uncritical of the vested interests attached to the existing organizational culture.

In most developing countries like Ghana, there exists an “overdeveloped” bureaucratic apparatus inherited as a colonial legacy and expanded through imitative postcolonial reforms, while the political, economic, and cultural realms remain largely underdeveloped. Bureaucratic institutions or governments are under enormous pressure to change. Call it reinventing, reengineering, or plain old change, but the mandate remains the same: produce more with less, and satisfy the customer while doing it. Yet, successful reforms must involve more than exhortation and slogans, a clear set of goals must be articulated. We suggest that it is necessary to go beyond parochial administrative measures and undertake more comprehensive policies to overcome the existing inappropriateness between bureaucracy and society by restructuring their interrelationship.

Establishment of blue-ribbon commissions: Reluctant though one should be about proposing blue-ribbon commissions, it seems reasonable to suggest a moratorium on new reforms until an independent body can complete a detailed examination of just how past

reforms have worked or failed - such a commission could provide a single list of statutes, rules, and reforms that should be abolished.

Restructuring will have positive economic outcomes in terms of minimizing bureaucratic intervention, creating local-level entrepreneurship, ensuring economic self-reliance, and reducing the influence of foreign capital over the local economy.

Performance Philosophy

The bureaucratic organizations should adopt Performance Rewards Philosophy. If a reform is to be successful, it must take into account the reward system, it must be suitable to the output expected (Performance Philosopher). This because what bureaucrats do depends not only on what they think their primary task is, but to a large degree on who they think they are - this sometimes does not add any results to the organization. For instance, why is it that once a bureaucracy is created it's almost impossible to get rid of? A look at the recent attempts to solve our intelligence problems will confirm that, as it has added more layers of bureaucrats, as if that will somehow solve the problem.

Education

Lastly, there should also be a deliberate education to reorient the perceptions of the Ghanaian society about bureaucracy.

The proposed recommendations basically represent a tentative outline that might require further revision depending on the concrete socio-historical conditions that prevail. It is worthy to note, however, that every reform, no matter how well intended, has at least some unintended consequences, whether through misinterpretation, maladministration, or conflicts with already existing reforms.

We conclude that practically nothing by way of quality management, service-government, or employee involvement can succeed with these towering organizations. But practically nothing will fail if a radical "down- layering" is undertaken now.

Recommendation for Future Study

Include interviews to get a descriptive statistical view from the sample population


Concrete societal elements like culture and tradition must be considered.

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Organogramme Of Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly



CHRISTIAN SERVICE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE – KUMASI

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS STUDIES

BACHELOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

We are level 400 students of the above institution pursuing Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration (Human Resource option). As a requirement of the course, we are conducting a research on the topic "Assessment of Office Bureaucracy in Institutions in Ghana and Its Effects on the Performance of Organisations". We will be very grateful for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as truly as possible and to the best of your knowledge.

Any information provided will be treated as confidential and use strictly for academic purposes.

PLEASE TICK [✓] WHERE APPROPRIATE AND FILL IN THE SPACES WITH APPROPRIATE ANSWERS.

1. What is your age?

Below 20 [] 21-30 [] 31 - 40 [] 41-50 [] 51 – 60 [] 61 +
[]

2. Gender Male [] Female []

3. How long have you been working in this organisation?

4. Which department do you belong to?

Administration [] Budget [] Engineering [] Environmental Health []

Internal Audit [] IT-MIS [] Finance [] Planning []

Waste Management [] Other (please specify)

5. Do you have or practice bureaucracy in your organisation?

Yes []

No []

6. Why does your organisation adopt/practice a bureaucratic system/bureaucracy?

A. To get work done properly []

B. For proper documentation []

C. To serve as a control mechanism []

7. Which of the following sectors do you think adopt more of bureaucratic procedures?

Public []

Private []

8. How would you rate the existence of bureaucracy in private organisations?

Low (flexible rules) []

Normal (relaxed rules) []

High (strict rules) []

9. How would you rate the existence of bureaucracy in public organisations?

Low (flexible rules) []

Normal (relaxed rules) []

High (strict rules) []

10. Do you or your clients react positively when going through bureaucratic processes?

Yes []

No []

11. Does bureaucracy have any negative effect on your organisations' performance?

Yes []

No []

12.If yes in (11), please specify

.....
.....

13.Does bureaucracy have any positive effect on your organisations' performance?

yes []

No[]

14. If yes (13), please specify.....

.....
.....
.....

15. Do you think organisations should go on with their bureaucratic procedures?

Yes []

No []

If yes, give reasons

.....
.....
.....

If no, give reasons

.....
.....
.....

16. Bureaucracy creates more rules and procedures than necessary.

Yes []

No []

17. Do you think bureaucracy stifles employees' initiatives/creativities?

Yes[]No[]

18. Does the system slow down decision making due to the formal clearly defined hierarchical structure.

Yes [] No []

19. What other problems do you face under this system in carrying out your duties?

.....
.....

20. Do you have laid down procedures or fixed rules that everybody must follow?

Yes [] No []

21. Are there restrictions in your area of jurisdiction?

Yes [] No []

22. Do you think the system decreases co-ordination among those in authority?

Yes [] No []

23. Is management ready to minimize bureaucratic procedures in your organisations?

Yes [] No []

24. Will you like a less bureaucratic organisation?

Yes [] No []

25. In what way(s) do you think bureaucracy can be beneficial to the

organisation?.....
.....

26. In line with the problems stated in questions (18) above, what suggestions would you give to solve those problems?

.....
.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

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